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This study examined the effects of task clarification, group feedback, and policy
change on incident form completion by police officers. Participants included all sworn
officers employed in the Operations Division by the Kalamazoo Department of Public
Safety. The task consisted of completing the modus operandi (MO) section of the
incident reports for burglary, robbery and aggravated assault. The main dependent
variable was the percentage of incident reports with MO form completion. The
secondary dependent variable was quality of the MOs completed in the reports; more
specifically the completeness of the MO section compared to the narrative and
discrepancies between the narrative and the MO section.
A multiple baseline design across crime type and shift (day, night, and power)
was used. During baseline, across shifts, MO reporting for burglary was 27%, robbery
was 6%, and aggravated assault was 5%. After task clarification and officer and
sergeant group feedback were implemented for day and night shift, MO reporting for
burglary increased to 70%, robbery increased to 27%, and aggravated assault increased
to 12%. The sergeant report rejections only phase continued to maintain similar results
for burglary and robbery, however aggravated assault MO form completion increased to

21%. During the general order condition, MO reporting continued to increase across all
crime types with burglary MO reporting increasing to 79%, robbery increasing to 70%
and aggravated assault increasing to 29%.
Visual inspection of the data suggested that task clarification and group
feedback, and sergeant report rejections are effective interventions to assist with
increasing report writing. Also, as new policies are preparing to go into place, such
interventions could be used to help employees with upcoming organizational changes.
A case study presented along with this experiment also investigated the impact of the
MOs reported by using them to track a certain crime pattern.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Reporting of national crime rates is important for law enforcement agencies if
they are to have a broad understanding of various crime trends across the country.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR),
in 2009 violent crimes that occurred against individuals decreased by 5.3% from that of
the crime reported to law enforcement agencies in the previous year. In 2009, the
estimated number of violent offenses has decreased by 5.3% since the 2008 estimate
(Investigation, 2010). Although the national crime trend for violent crimes appears to be
declining, the crime rates for the state of Michigan convey a different trend. In 2009, the
overall incidents reported for crimes against another person (e.g., homicide, aggravated
assault, sexual assault) showed no change from the 2008 report, however, burglary did
increase by 3% (Police, 2009). In the city of Kalamazoo, Michigan, the overall serious
crimes against society reported in 2009 increased by 1%. The comparative increase from
previous years was not staggering and likely not significant, however when analyzed
individually, many serious crimes showed a larger increase. For example:
homicide/murder increased by 66.5%, rape increased by 8.93%, and burglary increased
by 19.7% (Kalamazoo Public Safety, 2009). Although it is possible from a national
standpoint that the national crime rate is decreasing, another possible explanation for the
discrepancy could be method and quality of report data entry that produces these crime
report statistics.
1

2
Over the years, there have been differing views regarding which policing method
is the most effective in terms of structure and overall crime rate reduction. One of the
most effective methods during its first years of implementation was the Computer-Driven
Crime Statistics Method (CompStat), which, in 1990, was an experimental program that
was implemented by the New York Transit Police because of increasingly high crime
rates. After employing the use of CompStat for the Transit Police, crime rates decreased
by 75% in the subway system after five years. When this model was adopted in 1993
across the entire New York City Police Department (NYPD), ridership in the subway
system increased (McDonald, 2002) and crime rates in the City of New York decreased
by 50% in seven years, causing the city to drop from 114 to 163 (out of 200) on the list of
most dangerous cities to live with a population above 100,000 (Walsh, 2001). Although
there are several variables that could have contributed to the improvement in crime rates
during this time, it is possible CompStat could have had an impact.
The keys to the success of CompStat are managerial accountability and
information gathering and processing. By definition, CompStat is a “goal-orientated
strategic management process that uses technology, operational strategy and managerial
accountability to structure the delivery of police services and provide safety to
communities” (Walsh, 2001, p. 352). The model is designed to improve the core
dissemination of information between management and deployment personnel and
involves the following steps. 1) Weekly crime data are pulled from the computer system
and analyzed for crime trends by the management team. 2) The management team
decides where to best focus deployment of personnel and resources based on the
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information in their current system. 3) Precinct managers meet monthly to discuss
various crime trend data and see if additional focus is needed in certain locations across
multiple jurisdictions (Walsh, 2001).
Given that the information gathering and analysis component of CompStat is what
makes this model effective (Goldstein & Susmilch, 1981; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008), it
is important to identify and understand the data input and analysis process. CompStat and
other models typically employ some form of geographic information systems (GIS)
mapping in their analysis. The most commonly used forecasting approach in policing is
the “hot spot” method. This approach extracts location information from the crimes that
have already occurred and inputs a point to represent the incident on a map; certain types
of crimes (e.g., murder, burglary, rape) are typically categorically mapped together to
gain a better representation of the points or dots on the map. Although this is the most
widely used method across policing agencies, it can be the least predictive method
depending on its use. The premise that GIS crime mapping attempts to address is that the
crime frequency and offender (see near repeat hypothesis) are linked. In theory this
conceptualization is plausable, however it has been suggested that a minimum of one
year's worth of data are needed before any predictive results are accurate (Groff & La
Vigne, 2002).
The use of crime analysis as a tool for crime pattern detection is widely employed
across numerous law enforcement and goverment agencies. One of the earliest defintions
of crime analysis states that crime analysis:
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studies daily reports of serious crimes in
order to determine the location, time, and
special characteristics, similarities to other
criminal attacks, and various significant
facts that might help to identify either a
criminal or the existence of a pattern of
criminal activity. (Bruce, 2008, pp. 10)

Although this definition is quite broad, the beginning stages of crime analysis identifies
more with a tactical analysis classiciation. The tactical approach to analysis incorporates
a) the notion of identifying crime patterns by focusing on commonalities (i.e., who, what,
where, when, why, and how) across incidents, b) analyzing the patterns, c) notifying
agency administrators of potential crime patterns, and d) assist with the development of
the best tactics to address the crime patterns. In addition to the "here and now" analysis of
a tactical crime analysis approach, a strategic approach evaluates long term crime
patterns of interest to the community of interest. By gathering a larger amount of data
over time, the use of crime analysis allows for an understanding of various trends,
whether positive, negative or neutral. By having an understanding of trends across time in
a general location (i.e., increasing crime in a certain area), than a more objective form of
police force reallocation can be utilized (Bruce, 2008).
Another widely used method that address crime frequency and offender would be
the repeat victimization method, also known as the near repeat hypothesis. The basis of
this method is that data showing that “individuals or places that have been victimized
once are likely to be victimized again, and the time course to subsequent victimization in
a few short months,” (Groff & La Vigne, 2002, p. 36). In 2004, Bowers and Johnson
conducted an analysis on the spatial location and the “priori predictions…regarding the

5
way in which repeat incidents are committed" (p.13); or modus operandi (MO), to
enhance their findings of distinguishing information between offenders and occurrence of
incidents. The authors compiled point of entry, means of entry, distance of occurrence
and time of occurrence for 3,562 burgularies between April 1997 and March 1998, in
Merseyside, England. Results indicated that the incidents that occurred in closer
proximity (<400m), had similar MO patterns, and dissimilar MOs when the crimes were
committed in a further range of area (>400m). Furthermore, not only did the crimes that
were committed in similar proximity share similar MO patterns, but the incidents also
occurred within the same time period as the previous victim’s incident (Bowers &
Johnson, 2004).
The repeat victimization method is slightly more complex than the hotspot
because it’s attempting to take the dots on the map and analyze them one step further; the
goal is to see if the dots on the map are linked to any other crimes in the law
enforecement database. There are other more advanced GIS mapping models that use
multivariate statistical designs or employ advanced neural networks computing power
(Groff & La Vigne, 2002), but where they exceed in computational prowess, they may
lack in simple data input. What are the key informational components to accurately
predicting criminal activity? Adderely and Musgrove (2003) demonstrated that after
adding MO component information to an advanced neural network of offenders/offenses,
offense accuracy increased from 10-15% to 55%. Given these figures, what are the
critical elements of MO deliniation that enhances predictive analysis computing
capabilities?
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Modus Operandi
According to Douglas and Munn (1992), the MO is commonly referred to as a
specific signature of a crime that is often prevalent as the offenders' progress in the
criminal process. The MO may change slightly from case to case, however the basic
fundamentals of the MO are the common factors that link cases together (Douglas &
Munn, 1992). In other words, behaviors that succeed in the past are likely to be repeated
in the future (i.e., reinforcement) (Miltenberger, 2008), which explains why the
foundational portions of the MOs are consistent across repeat offenders. Even behavior
that is not instrumental to the success of the crime can be adventitiously reinforced by the
crime succeeding and are therefore more likely to be repeated.
After a crime occurs it is important for the reporting officer to enter the data
accurately into the system. This produces an extensive database of clues that provides
information that can be electronically linked to other databases to assist in solving crimes.
Computer analysis provides the “brute force” power to identify correlations that would
take a large number of man-hours to identify using traditional analysis methods.
The ability of a department to move toward predictive policing relies heavily on
the data collected from police officers in the field. Predictive policing involves taking
data from various sources “analyzing them, and using results to anticipate, prevent and
respond more effectively to future crime (Pearsall, 2010, p. 16).” This method takes the
policing from a reactive mode to a proactive mode, which assists officers in identifying
potential high-risk areas for crime (it’s essentially the proverbial “heads-up” model for
policing). This information allows police to saturate the areas where they think the next
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crime(s) may occur with more officers, as well as communicate this information to the
residents.

Uniformed Crime Report
While it is important to distinguish the MO for criminal behavior in a police
report, it is also important to denote which types of crime signify an MO backing. The
Uniformed Crime Report (UCR) is a “collective effort on the city, county state tribal, and
federal law enforcement agencies to present a nationalwide view of crime (p. 1).” In
1927, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) commissioned a
committee to develop, collect and review police statistics, which helped shape the current
categories in use today. Of the crimes that were reviewed, those that were discovered to
be based on their “seriousness, frequency of occurrence, pervasiveness in all geographic
areas of the country, and likelihood of being reported to law enforcement”, otherwise
known as Part I crimes are listed as the follows: felonious homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggrevated assault, burglary-breaking or entering, larceny-theft, auto theft, and
arson (Uniformed Crime Reports, 2004, p. 2).
Given the severity of Part I crimes, those agencies participating in the UCR
program report their incident records and arrest records regarding these crimes to the FBI
at monthly intervals. These data are then combined into aggregate data to form crime
trends across the nation. Since these data are placed into a national database, it is
important for the incident information entering the database to contain behavioral crime
components in the event that the offender moves across multiple jurisdictions. Crimes
with similar MOs can later be analyzed, and in theory, traced back to the original
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offender—as explained by the earlier theories of the near repeat hypothesis, repeat
victimisation, and components of CompStat. However, in order for the earlier explained
theories to work, the MO related to the crime would need to be included in the report.

Improving Modus Operandi Reporting
As previously described, MO(s) related to a crime are an important component to
an incident report, as those are data that can later be used to predict the future likelihood
of a crime by a repeat offender. Given the importance of recording these data, there are
several ways in which organizational behavior management (OBM) techniques can be
employed to increase MO reporting methods (Wilder, Austin, & Casella, 2009). One
method would be to deliver performance feedback, which as noted by Alvero, Bucklin,
and Austin (2001), has been defined differently by various authors:
(a) information that is given to persons
regarding the quantity or quality of their past
performance (Prue & Fairbank, 1981), (b)
information transmitted back to the
responder
following
a
particular
performance (Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer,
1991), (c) information that tells performers
what and how well they are doing (Rummler
& Brache, 1995), and (d) information about
performance that allows an individual to
adjust his or her performance. (Daniels,
1994, pp. 4-5)
The lack of consensus regarding the definition of performance feedback has led
some to suggest that it’s a discriminative stimulus evoking control over performance in
certain environmental contingencies (Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1986); others have
stated it functions as a reinforcer. Yet those that do not prescribe to either side of the
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behavioral contingency say that performance feedback serves multiple functions, either a
reinforcer/or punisher, depending on the learning history of the individual and can also be
influenced by establishing operations and rule-governed behavior (Alvero, Bucklin, &
Austin, 2001).
The findings of these two comprehensive reviews of performance feedback differ
in their results. Balcazar et al. (1986) found that graphic, daily, feedback combined with
another form of consequence to be the most effective method. In a later review, Alvero et
al. (2001) found weekly, written, feedback plus a form of antecedent intervention to be
the most effective method of delivery. Aside from the controlling variable of feedback, it
has been found to be a valuable tool, compared to no feedback. Feedback has been shown
to increase performance across an array of different individuals across various settings
such as: driver behavior (Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, & Geller, 2002; Nau, Van Houten,
Rolider, & Jonah, 1993; Van Houten & Nau, 1983), nurse universal precaution
compliance (Stephens & Ludwig, 2005), retail settings regarding cashier suggestive
selling (Lowey & Bailey, 2007; Ralis & O'Brien, 1987), cashier register accountability
(Rohn, Austin, & Lutrey, 2003), restaurant employee performance (Amigo, Smith, &
Ludwig, 2008), and hotel employee performance (LaFleur & Hyten, 1995).
In addition to its many applications, feedback has been used as a behavioral
intervention to increase desired performance in organizational settings. According to a
review of performance feedback in organizational settings by Nordstrom, Lorenzi, and
Hall (1991), the authors agreed with the previously mentioned reviews on feedback in
that the definition and procedure of delivery of performance feedback is somewhat vague
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across studies. Because of the vague details across studies, the authors mentioned that the
“relative effectiveness of the various components of the feedback intervention does not
lend itself to clear statements” (p. 119). However, the authors do mention that the
research compiled within the review suggests that feedback in combination with a form
of a package intervention is most effective at achieving desired levels of performance for
target behaviors in an organization.
In 1977, Kreitner, Reif, and Morris reported one of the first case studies of its
kind on the use feedback in an applied setting. This study was conducted on mental
health technician (MHT) target performance across three target areas: conducting and
completing group therapy sessions, conducting and completing individual therapy
sessions, and completing individual assignments. During the feedback condition, the
experimenters posted interoffice memos for each target behavior with the individual
MHT’s name on the memo. The authors reported that the three target behaviors improved
after the feedback condition was implemented (i.e., increases in level were observed
across all three behaviors). Also, the shift supervisor reported that conflict during therapy
sessions between MHTs and patients appeared to decrease, possibly due to increased
effectiveness of therapy sessions. By having the knowledege of their current
performance levels during therapy, the therapists were able to improve their in-therapy
performance, which allowed for them to host higher quality sessions with their clients.
Jones, Morris, and Barnard (1985) evaluated the effects of a feedback package
intervention on civil commitment form accuracy completion and timeliness completion.
Civil commitment is a process by which a judge decides if a person should be required to
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undergo psychiatric or mental health treatment. The package intervention consisted of
instructional meetings with staff members to review the civil commitment form process,
the data necessary for the form and the time commitment necessary on the form. Group
graphic performance feedback on correctly completed civil commitment forms was then
provided to the staff in the intervention package. Results indicated a 41% increase in
rights forms completed correctly, 18% increase in applications completed correctly, and a
21% increase in witness lists completed correctly. Application forms and witness list
baseline levels were already arguably higher compared to rights forms, therefore there
was a greater opportunity for improvement in the completion of rights forms. The authors
noted that the package intervention across all forms did increase correct completion, and
completion maintained during the follow-up time period. One interesting result was that
as correct form completions increased, the number of forms completed per week
decreased slightly, which could have been due to the increase in accuracy. This research
suggests that a package intervention across similar behaviors can be an effective
intervention strategy to increase MO reporting in the present study, without a major
impact on the quality of the reported information.
Although performance feedback alone has been shown to be an effective
intervention for increasing target performance in organizations, goal setting might be
added to the intervention package. A goal, or a specific standard of proficiency on a task
to be completed within a predetermined time limit (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham,
1981), can enhance the effectiveness feedback if desired levels are not achieved initially.
For instance, Calpin, Edelstein, and Redmon (1988) compared the use of self monitoring,
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a form of feedback, and self-monitoring plus goal setting on therapists' direct contact
work hours spent with clients. The experimenters found that compared to baseline levels,
the proportion of work hours spent increased during the self-monitoring phase for groups
one and two. However, a slightly higher proportion of allocated work hours spent with
clients were observed during the self-monitoring plus goal setting phase across all three
groups. The authors reported that there was a possibility that the individual goals
assigned to the therapists were too hard to achieve due to the fact that the therapists
across all groups reached productivity levels approximately 15% of the weeks during the
self-monitor and goal setting phases. In this particular study goal setting did increase
overall productivity, however the increases that were observed did not increase to
socially significant levels given that goals were not consistantly met.
Package feedback interventions have been shown to be effective interventions on
customer service related behaviors in an organization setting (Crowell, Abel, & Sergio,
1988; Slowiak, Madden, & Mathews, 2006; Tittelbach, Deangelis, Sturmey, & Alvero,
2007). In 1988, Crowell, Abel, and Sergio observed several customer service
performance behaviors at a bank. The experimenters were interested in improving
employee customer interactions while customers were in the bank. The behavioral targets
of interest were time to service, greeting, expression of concern, using customer’s name,
talking only to customer, additional assistace, minimizing small talk, responding to
customer inquiries, expression of appreciation, closing and voice tone. Each target
behavior was assigned a weighted point value, referred to as “quality points.” For
example, the expression of appreciation category was worth a total of 10 points,
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compared to the closing category which was valued at 5 points. The bank managers
decided that an overall standard measure of 85 points throughout the entire customer
exchange was equivalent to acceptable performance. The interventions delivered in this
study were task clarification, feedback, praise, and later feedback plus praise. The results
of the study indicated a mean increase of 10.6 average points from baseline to task
clarification from 61.4 to 72 points. Further increases were observed after the feedback
phase was implented with average quality points increasing to 81.4 points, with an
average of 78 points. The minimum point average during the praise condition was 85
points, which met management’s standards of acceptable performance. After a second
baseline was introduced, similar increases in quality points were observed across
feedback and praise. The authors indicated that due to the immediate increase in
responding followed by a slight decline during task clarification, it is likely that task
clarification served as an antecedent. Also, the authors further noted that feedback more
likely served as a consequence due to the fact that there was an increased level of
responding followed by stablilization. In the present study, task clarification and group
feedback will be presented as a combined intervention given that the above research has
demonstrated the individual effectiveness of these interventions, and it is further likely
that by combining these two that more desired performance will be achieved.
In 2006, Slowiak, Madden, and Mathews, focused on telephone customer service
behaviors of staff in a medical clinic. The behaviors of interest were greating, friendly
voice tone, and closing. The package intervention of task clarification, feedback, goal
setting, and contingent consequences was delivered across an ABAB reversal design for
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all three target behaviors. Task clarification consisted of a handout of the clinic’s
customer service standards, along with defined components of what constituted a correct
greeting, voice tone, and closing. A job aid that provided a list of examples of appropriate
greetings was placed next to the participant’s computer. Goal setting was establised for
the overall group for each behavior, while performance feedback was delivered twice a
week to each participant at the beginning of their shift. Feedback consisted of an email
with an attached bar graph displaying their individual feedback relative to their goal
performance for the week. Written feedback was also provided as an explanation of the
values presented in the graphic feedback. Performance contingent consequences, or
incentives, were given to those participants that met their weekly goals. This extensive
package intervention yielded higher levels of telephone customer service behaviors
compared to both baseline conditions across two of the three behaviors. Although the
package being proposed in the present study is much less extensive, the methods of
feedback delivery used in Slowiak et al. may be an effective medium of delievery, if
modified for group implementation rather than on an individual basis. Tittelbach,
Deangelis, Sturmey, and Alvero (2007) also evaluted a package intervention of task
clarification, feedback, and goal setting to improve customer service behaviors of student
advisors at a university. The feedback package was successful at improving the overall
results of customer service behaviors.
Wilk and Redmon (1990) improved the productivity of university admissions staff
via a package intervention of feedback and goal setting. The authors developed an
intervention system in which the employees of a university’s admissions office received
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daily feedback based on their performance the previous day. In addition to feedback, each
employee was given an individual application processing goal for the day, based on the
previous day’s task completion. The frequency of adjusted goals allowed for the goals to
be difficult, yet attainable, and also to meet the seasonal processing demands within the
department. Results of this study indicated that during baseline on average across all
three admissions processors, approximately 33 applications were completed per week.
After the package intervention was implemented, approximately 126 applications on
average were completed per week. The authors reported that the intervention also
reduced the amount of money spent in overtime costs reduced from the previous year
$10,835.55 to $6,131.50 the year the intervention was implemented.
Interventions such as these have also shown to be effective in producing
increasing results in manufacturing environments. Jessup and Stahelski (1999) analyzed
the production of aluminum baked anodes in a large manufacturing plant. During an
extended baseline period, the experimenters noted that the employees were disposing of
over 300 rejected anodes per week, which accounted for roughly 8.6 percent of their 3500
minimum anode production requirement. The experimenters focused on assisting
organizations in producing a higher quality product and reducing waste. This was
achieved by providing the employees with a combination of feedback on rejected anodes,
setting a goal of 50 rejected nodes less than baseline levels and a group lunch incentive if
the goal was met. This first intervention worked after several weeks of implementation.
The next two subsequent interventions used the same process, except the goal was
reduced significantly, until it was down to less than 60 rejected anodes per week. The
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overall results indicated that the rejected nodes continued to decrease along with the
interventions. Although node rejects appear to have increased during the follow-up
period, the average did not return to baseline levels. The authors also indicated that the
average cost savings per week for the increase in quality of the nodes was roughly
$11,200 to $16,900, and the organization was able to meet customer demand while
decreasing defects.
Changes in an organization’s work policies can be another effective strategy for
producing desired behavior change, especially if budgetary constraints restrict an
organization from other means of increasing desired behavior (i.e., adding employee
incentives). Andrasik, McNamara, and Abbott (1978) evaluated the institution of a staff
policy change relating to unexcused absences and the managerial action taken to correct
for future occurrence of this undesirable behavior. During baseline, 15% of absences
resulted in follow-up action to prevent the unexcused absence in the future. During the
policy revision condition where employees were required to fill out a form explaining
why the unexcused absence occurred. During the policy revision condition, results of the
policy 80.5% of absences required follow-up action. One limitation of this study was that
the authors were unable to complete a follow-up condition due to the facility closing. The
results did show that something as minimal as a policy change can produce a marked
change in behavior. However, if other interventions were used in conjunction with policy
change, it is possible that the follow-up compliance might have increased to even higher
levels.
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Organizational policies relating to safe driving behavior have shown to be
effective when explicitly stated. Ludwig and Geller (1999) analyzed driving behavior of
pizza drivers at two stores. Both stores received driving policy notices at two separate
times with their paychecks stating that all drivers must use their turn signal to indicate a
change in driving direction while on delivery. The participants were observed for both
their turning signal usage and their seat belt usage. After receiving both policy notices,
turning signal usage increased at Site A from 70% to 78% after the first policy and then
to 84% after the second policy; Site B signal usage increased from 46% to 51% after the
first policy, then to 59% after the second policy. The authors also examined whether
receiving a policy for one driving behavior would generalize to other driving behaviors.
The authors reported that seat belt usage at Site A decreased from78% to 65% and Site B
from 74% to 59%. It is possible that due to the different response classes of the
behaviors, the policy change would not have been effective on seat-belt usage regardless.
However, this does suggest that in an organization while trying to institute a new policy,
the changes need to be explicit and need to be directly written for the behavior of interest.
Although organizational leaders might argue that starting with a policy change
initially might be the most efficient and effective way to get employees to complete the
desired behavior that might not be the best strategy. Using techniques, such as task
clarification, feedback, and possibly goal setting prior to an abrupt policy change will
help facilitate the change and lessen the negative administrative aspects that might result
from an abrupt change in the system. If a policy change is used in immediately following
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other behavior change techniques, it may be better accepted and lead to a larger change in
behavior.
The results of a number of studies across a wide range of applications and
contexts suggest that task clarification, feedback and policy change can be effective
interventions to increase employee performance. It has been reported by Kalamazoo
Department of Public Safety administration that MO form completion in incident reports
is an issue related to efficiency that needs to be addressed in order to improve the efficacy
of the current predictive crime models. Although many OBM studies have evaluated the
use of these interventions, no studies have examined them as it pertains to increasing MO
reporting as an attempt to help an organization improve criminal behavior modeling. The
purpose of this study was to examine the effects of task clarification, group feedback, and
policy change on MO form completion and accuracy by police officers. Additionally,
this study assisted the department in the use of the MO data as a means of moving toward
predictive analysis.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Setting
The Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety (KDPS) is located in Kalamazoo,
Michigan, and is an organization that combines both law enforcement and fire services
into one unified organization. In other words, every KDPS law enforcement officer is
cross-trained as a fire fighter. Within KDPS, there are several divisions and special units:
Administration, Criminal Investigations, Fire Marshal, Kalamazoo Valley Enforcement
Team (KVET), Operations, Service, and Special Units (e.g., Bomb Squad, Canine Unit,
Community Policing Office, Explorers, Field Training Officer Program, Honor Guard,
Special Weapons and Tactics Team) and Traffic Enforcement (Divisions, 2011). The
division of focus for the study, the Operations Division, is responsible for all initial
responses to police, fire and emergency medical calls for local citizens. Regardless of
whether the response needed is an immediate emergency or to fill out a report, a member
of Operation’s Public Safety’s first responders unit attend to the needs of the citizens
(Operations Division, 2011).
All members of the Operations division enter incident reports in ILeads, the data
management system. See the Instrumentation section of this document for more
information about the ILeads system. The reports can be completed in multiple locations;
for instance reports can be completed at a computer terminal in the officer's patrol car or
the officer report writing room located within all of the eight sub-stations across the city
19
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and headquarters. All patrol cars contain a single Dell Semi-Rugged E-6400 Laptop
computer that is located to the right of the steering wheel, above the radio console. The
laptop is pre-installed with the ILeads program, which is necessary for the officers to
complete reports from the vehicle. Another feature of the laptop inside the vehicle is the
universal serial bus (USB) extension; this allows for uploading of narrative recordings of
incident files—KDPS civilian staff later transcribes those recordings. All vehicles are
equipped for officers to be able to complete their reports from their patrol cars so that
they can be visible on the streets and still working rather than in the station completing
paperwork (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Computer Located Inside Police Patrol Vehicle
Certain incidents require officers to come into the stations to complete incident
reports (e.g., drug case, arrest, and evidence logs); therefore they will opt to use the report
writing rooms at those times to complete their reports. Each room has a minimum of four
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computers, all of which contain the data management system necessary to access and
complete incident reports, and a USB extension for their narrative recording uploads,
similar to that found in the patrol vehicle. At three of the stations, including headquarters,
there is an additional computer that is used for the sole purpose of transferring and
uploading the digital video recording (DVR) information from patrol cars via the
COBAN Technologies© system to their data-base at headquarters. The COBAN
Technologies© system used is an encrypted digital video management solution (DVMS)
that protects potential evidence available on the patrol car cameras (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Report Writing Room Located at Headquarters

Participants
At the beginning of the study, the workforce at KDPS was comprised of 242
sworn officers within the Operations Division; at the end of the study there were a total of

22
239 officers. The average age of the participants was 32, with a range of 22-55 years.
Officers work on average 42 hours per week. Ten percent (10%) of the workforce are
female and 90% male. The average tenure for service of officers in this division is 12
years, with a range of employment of one year to 32 years. The education of the officers
ranges from associates degree to graduate degrees. This division was chosen as the
primary focus of the study because the Operations Division employs more sworn Public
Safety Officers (PSO) than any other division in the organization, and PSOs are required
to complete incident report forms after they respond to calls for service.
In the Operations Division, there are three main shifts of which PSOs are
assigned: The day shift is comprised of 49 officers with a shift time ranging from 7:00am
-to-7:00pm., the night shift is comprised of 47 officers with a shift range time of 7:00pmto-7:00am, the power shift is composed of 16 officers with a shift time ranging from
3:00pm-to-3:00am. Within each shift there are four platoons: Platoon A, Platoon B,
Platoon C, and Platoon D. Platoon assignment essentially dictates which day the PSOs
work, as that is dependent on the department's schedule. On February 13, 2011 the
Operations division completed an annual bid change; during the bid change officers had
the opportunity to change shifts and or platoon assignment. The new assignments
remained in effect until February 13, 2012.
Throughout the duration of the study, there were a few notable changes in
participation. One officer was killed in the line of duty whose data was included in group
baseline results, however was not included in treatment results. Another note worthy
mention was that due to city budget constraints, a few officer positions were cut and
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others were re-organized from different divisions across the organization. Constraints
with participant attrition will be assessed further in the discussion section.
Participants involved in the experiment were all sworn officers of KDPS's
Operations Division who regularly complete incident reports in ILeads. Given that KDPS
administration regularly collect data on their employees, voluntary participation was not
possible for the participants. However, all participants were over the age of 18 and
reviewed an Informed Consent Form found in Appendix A, which was approved by
Western Michigan University's (WMU) Human Subjects Institution Review Board
(HSIRB). The consent document explained to participants that all data that were collected
would remain confidential and no individual's data would be shared with administration
for punitive purposes. The approval letters from WMU's HSIRB are found in Appendix
B. A copy of the approval letter from the Chief of Police can be found in Appendix C.
Before and after the study, all sworn officers of KDPS were asked to complete a
survey regarding MO form completion. The participants involved in both surveys viewed
an informed consent along with their survey document, which can be found in Appendix
D. In addition to turning in the survey, if participants selected the option of "Yes" for
agreeing to have their survey data included in future research by WMU, the data were
recorded and analyzed. If the participant selected "No", the survey was set to the side and
not reviewed. A copy of the approval letter from WMU's HSIRB for the two survey's can
be found in Appendix E. A copy of both surveys can be found in Appendices F-G.
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Instrumentation
The public safety office uses a $2 million data management system developed by
Intergraph known as ILeads. This system allows officers to create incident forms
electronically, and attach all of the necessary information related to the specific case to
that single case identification number. For instance, if an officer needs to fill in
information related to a burglary, the victim’s information, evidence, the responding
officer’s narrative, witness statements, and other relevant information related to the case
would be filled in as an attachment to the incident report. Figures 3-6 display screen shots
from the ILeads records management system. ILeads also allows for easy records
management; the reports filed have searchable fields and can be easily compiled into
Microsoft Excel© via a compilation of a string of programming in the back end of the
system (Integraph, 2009). The data that were analyzed were automatically recorded and
downloaded from the ILeads data management system.

Figure 3. ILeads Incident Report Main Screen
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Figure 4. ILeads Page 2 Narrative Screen

Figure 5. ILeads Narrative Pop-up Window
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Figure 6. ILeads Incident Report Display Page 3

Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable for this study was MO form completion. The
quality of the MO data reported in the MO section was also examined; these data
reported were further broken down into completeness of the report and discrepancies
between the MO report on page 3 for a specific crime and the narrative filed as an
attachment to the incident report.
MO form completion. MO form completion is defined by the presence of a MO
notation on page 3 of the incident report in ILeads for the following Part I crimes:
burglary (breaking or entering), robbery, and aggravated assault. A list of all MOs in
ILeads are found in Appendix H. When an officer completes an incident report, the case
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is then approved at the officer level and then sent to the sergeant level for review.
Sergeants review the incidents to ensure all necessary information pertaining to the case
is included in the report (e.g., victim information, suspect information, narrative
information is complete, etc). The case goes through several other levels of review before
the case is sent over to records management, however if incorrect information is found at
this level, it's easier and faster for a sergeant to request that an officer make changes at
the first level of review.
A separate case study evaluating the impact of MO form completion on the
predictive capabilities in the department was conducted once the interventions were in
place for all shifts. Although there are no formal objective data to report regarding the use
of MO after the data were captured, a case study is presented in Appendix I illustrating
the use of MO to help the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) work toward solving a
pattern of copper theft crime across the city.
Completeness of MO section. The overall completeness of an incident report was
assessed by the following example: If an officer indicates in the narrative that the point of
entry for a burglary was the window, but the MO "Point of Entry/Window" was not
selected so that it appeared on page 3, then that would be considered a missing item for
completeness. However, selected if “Point of Entry/Window” as an MO, but was not
mentioned in the narrative, was not considered a discrepancy because in viewing a dropdown menu of MOs could have prompted the officer to select the necessary item(s). The
completeness measure of these reports was recorded as an indicator of consistency
between the two reports. It was also reviewed to determine if the officers were taking
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time to complete the MO section carefully. For the incident reports that had a recorded
MO, a sample of those reports were reviewed weekly for quality. The reports were read
and scored by both the experimenter and the research assistants.
Discrepancy between narrative and MO section. The overall discrepancy between
the narrative report and the completed MO section was assessed by the following
example: If the MO "Point of Entry/Front Door" was selected, then this would be
considered a discrepancy; If "Point of Entry/Window" was indicated in the narrative
report. However, it must be noted that in the latter instance, the narrative was always
viewed as correct; since an objective observer could not be present during the report
writing process, a selection as to which source was correct had to be determined at the
beginning of the study.

Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study were the use of various package
interventions. The interventions used were (a) task clarification and PSO group feedback
on MO form completion; (b) PSO group feedback plus sergeant group feedback on report
rejections; (c) and a policy change (from this point forward the policy change will be
referred to as a general order). Procedural details for each intervention are provided
below in the Procedures section.
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Experimental Design
A multiple baseline design (Bailey & Burch, 2002) across shift and crime time
was used to analyze the effects of task clarification, group feedback and the general order
on MO form completion. The interventions were implemented across shifts (day and
night shifts) and crime type concurrently. The crime types of interest to KDPS were
burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault. Each intervention was introduced first for day
shift and related to burglary crime type, then night shift with burglary crime type.
Burglary was the first crime type of focus because this crime type occurred more
frequently, therefore the participants had a higher likelihood of coming into contact with
the intervention(s). The next implementation focused on the remaining crime types,
robbery and aggravated assault across the day and night shifts. The power shift never
received an intervention across all crime types, other than the organizational wide general
order that was conducted at the end. Each data point represented the percentage of one
week's worth of completed MO reports.

Procedures
Recruitment
Administration regularly collects data via the ILeads system as a result of the
officer's report writing. Given that all participants are employed by KDPS, voluntary
participation was not possible for the participants. Regardless of the presence of the
experimenter, KDPS would have implemented extraneous report writing procedures.
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However, all participants were over the age of 18 and reviewed an Informed Consent
Form regarding their participation in a research study with WMU. The consent document
explained to participants that all data that were collected would be coded and kept
confidential so that no individual's data would be shared with administration for punitive
purposes.
Surveys
During the duration of the study, there were two organizational surveys that were
administered to all officers. Prior to the beginning of the study, officers completed a
survey asking questions such as; "What is modus operandi?", "When you complete your
reports, how often do you use the MO section?", "If you complete the MO section, what
happens after?". Questions such as these were asked initially to a) determine if the
officers were familiar with MO in terms of its meaning, b) get a sense of how often they
feel they complete the section, and c) if officers receive feedback from their supervisor if
they do complete the MO section.
The survey administered at the end of the study was intended to assess officer
awareness of the MO section and their perception of time consumption and usefulness of
completing the MO section. An example of questions asked in this survey were; "How
much more time did it take you to complete the incident reports when you completed the
MO section?", "What do you think in terms of the usefulness of the MO section of the
incident report?", "Do you think the requirement to complete the MO section has added
more functionality to ILeads to help solve crime?" Although the surveys were
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anonymous, both surveys asked participants for their permission to allow their responses
to be included in a research study with WMU.
Baseline
Baseline data that were collected were archival data from the ILeads data
management system. The data that were collected were all-electronic and in reference to
the MO sections completed. The KDPS Senior Systems Analyst downloaded baseline
data, and all subsequent data, weekly. The 11 weeks of archival data were downloaded
into weekly sets. A unique code sequence that pulls information from ILeads was written
at the beginning of the experiment and used throughout the study; the only regular change
in the coding were the dates reported. The dates for each week always ranged from
Sunday-Saturday of the previous week. The downloaded information included the
following: Agency, incident report number, incident date reported, incident time reported,
UCR crime type code and description, neighborhood/zone of occurrence, MO group 1,
MO group 2, geographic x-coordinate, geographic y-coordinate. The downloaded raw
data did not include any individual identifiers with a specific employee. This data set was
compiled for all crime types, then uploaded into a Microsoft Excel© spread sheet. Next,
the experimenter compared each incident report from the downloaded list to a printed
hard copy of employees per shift document provided by administration. A comparison
of the reporting officer and the list was used to verify under which shift the report was
completed (i.e., day, night, or power). The data were then coded per shift; no employee
identifiers were added to the raw data. The list was only used as a comparison for coding
purposes, and when not in use was kept separate from all raw data.
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Task Clarification and PSO Group Feedback on MO Completion
Participants received task clarification and feedback on MO form completion for
the proceeding week at the start of this condition. During subsequent weeks they only
received weekly feedback on the previous weeks MO completion. The instruction was
delivered in the form of a memorandum sent via email by the Executive Lieutenant of the
Operations Division. The memoranda consisted of an explanation of where the MO
section can be found in the incident report, what information needs to be included in the
report drop-down menus, and why it is important to complete the reports correctly. The
memorandum was first delivered to the day shift in relation to the burglary crime type.
The night shift was next to receive the same memorandum, but this occurred seven weeks
after day shift received their document. The power shift did not receive a copy of the
memorandum, as this shift was the control group. A copy of the memorandum delivered
to officers can be found in Appendix J.
In conjunction with task clarification, group feedback was provided to the PSOs
on both the day and night shifts regarding their MO form completion. Figure 7 is an
example of the graphic feedback provided to the PSOs. The graphs consisted of a display
of percentage of incident reports with MO completed for the week. The graphs also
contained a description indicating the date range of performance and if MO form
completion increased or decreased compared to the previous week.
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Figure 7. Day Shift PSO Group Graphic Feedback

The graphs were created by the experimenter weekly and were emailed to the
appropriate shift officers via the Executive Lieutenant; the experimenter was blind carbon
copied on all emails to the shifts to ensure the feedback was delivered. Email was the
chosen medium of delivery because the debrief meetings prior to each shift departure
were only long enough to include crime related issues for the day. The shift lieutenants
met once a month to discuss administrative and community issues; this meeting occurred
too infrequent to pass along performance information related to officers. Day shift was
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the first to receive group feedback on MO form completion along with the task
clarification memorandum explained above.

PSO Group Feedback Plus Sergeant Group Feedback on Report Rejection
PSO group feedback was provided as described in the previous condition. In
addition to PSO group feedback, shift sergeants were given the option of rejecting reports
if the PSO officers did not complete the MO section. This was not specified as a
requirement but only as a suggestion. When a sergeant rejects a report, a comment is
included in the report rejection notes section. This allows for sergeants to specify what
information needs to be revised in the report. In addition, shift sergeants also received
group graphic feedback on the percentage of reports accepted without form completion
during the previous week. Figure 8 is an example of the graphic feedback graphs the shift
sergeants received each week. As with the officer graphs, a description of report
approvals without MO completion was provided along with an indication of whether the
performance decreased or increased compared to the previous week.
The day shift received this combination of interventions first. Then, the night shift
received the entire combination of PSO and sergeant group feedback plus sergeant report
rejections intervention six weeks after day shift. This intervention was implemented
across all crime types, first for burglary, then for robbery and aggravated assault. The
power shift was not directly exposed to this intervention across all crime types.
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Figure 8. Day Shift Sergeant Group Graphic Feedback
Partial Reversal
Group graphic feedback to both the officers and the sergeants was no longer
delivered during this phase. Although the purpose of this phase was to remove the
interventions prior to the next phase, the general order, two of the components could not
be removed. Task clarification was a type of training that cannot be removed from the
officer's repertoire. The option of sergeant rejecting reports without an MO section
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completed was also not removed as the administration wanted to keep this component in
place.
General Order
The policy change, known as the general order in this study, was the final
intervention component that was implemented. The purpose of the general order is to
enforce policies and procedures that are unique to the organization. The general order
document provides a purpose and detailed description of the necessary actions required
for compliance. For KDPS, general order (G-65) pertaining to Investigations and Report
Writing, was revised to include MO form completion as a requirement. A copy of the
general order that was sent to the entire organization can be found in Appendix K.
Data Analysis
Since single-subject design methodology was used as the main design in this
study, visual analysis was utilized as the primary means of data analysis. According to
Kazdin (1982), if a study's results are not compelling enough to meet the necessary
criteria of level, trend, and variability once displayed graphically, then there is a high
likelihood that statistical analysis would be well. In addition, Bailey and Burch (2002)
note that if statistical analysis are used in single-subject designs to show significant
results, often-times the results are merely that and not socially significant to the behaviors
of interest being analyzed.
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After each incident report was coded for each week, a percentage of MO form
completion for each week was determined. First, the overall total number of incident
reports that were written per shift were determined. Then, the total number of reports per
shift (per crime type) with an MO for the incident was determined. The total number of
reports with an MO completed per shift (per crime type) was divided by the total number
of incident reports per shift, then that value was multiplied by 100 to yield a percentage
for the week. For each phase, visual inspection was used to determine if the data levels
changed when anticipated, were stable and if the data points were trending in either a
positive or negative direction. If at any time the data appeared to be unstable based on the
above criteria, the phase was extended until the data stabilized.

Inter-observer Agreement (IOA)
Since the primary dependent variable of MO form completion was recorded and
coded electronically, inter-observer agreement (IOA) data were not recorded. Agreement
on the quality of MO reports, however, was completed. Prior to the beginning of the
experiment, the experimenter was trained by the Executive Lieutenant of the Operations
Division on reporting reading and MO entering. The main purpose of this training to
ensure that the experimenter was able to decipher which MOs were explicitly read in the
narrative and which MOs were missing from the report that were stated in the narrative
(referred to as completeness). After the experimenter and the Executive Lieutenant
independently received 100% reliability on eight incident reports, the experimenter then
trained the research assistant to complete the same process.
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Inter-observer agreement for the overall quality of reports were completed for
49% of burglary reports, 45% of robberies, and 55% of aggravated assaults. This was
above the minimum 30% of observations recommended by Bailey and Burch (2002).
There were two separate forms of IOA that were conducted relating to the completeness
of the reports. These data that were recorded were automatically downloaded from the
ILeads data management system, but the MO selections that were indicated were
reviewed. For the MO items that were indicated by the officers in the report, two
independent observers recorded an "x" in the "yes" column if the indicated MO's were
listed in the officer's narrative, and "x" in the "no" column if the recorded MO was not
listed in the narrative. IOA for reported burglary MO items was 93% (range, 66%-100%),
robbery was 98% (range, 87%-100%), and aggravated assault was 95% (range, 67%100%).
The other form of IOA recorded was on the completeness. An item was scored as
incomplete if an incident had missing MOs that were mentioned in the narrative but were
not captured in the MO section by the officer. Two independent observers reviewed each
incident narrative and listed MOs that were indicated in the narrative but were not listed
by the officer. Due to the wide variety of MO options, the missing MO component had to
be re-reviewed by the observers. Not all narrative reports contained a specific section
header of "method of operation," which would have made it easier for the experimenter
and research assistant to pull information. Retraining of the experimenter and the
research assistant was necessary to ensure both independent observers were reviewing all
cases under the same parameters. After retraining occurred, entire narratives had to be
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reevaluated. Each observer recorded his or her results independently and IOA was rerecorded. IOA for completeness of missing items for burglary was 94% (range, 75%100%), robbery was 92% (range, 66%-100), and aggravated assault was 96% (range, 66100%). IOA for discrepancies for burglary, robbery and aggravated assault items was
100%.
IOA for both completeness measures were calculated by taking the number of
agreements divided by the number of disagreements plus the number of disagreements.
The resulting value was then multiplied by the number 100 to yield a percentage value.
An overall IOA average for each week was obtained for both IOA completeness values.
The IOA averages are results of those averages.

Independent Variable Integrity
To ensure the delivery of the treatments, the Executive Lieutenant and the
experimenter communicated via electronic mail (email) to track the progress of the study.
The experimenter would send an email of the necessary graphs and email wording to the
Executive Lieutenant every week; the email also included instructions if a new phase was
being implemented. The Executive Lieutenant then sent the experimenter a blind carbon
copy of each email distribution to the officers as insurance that the treatment went into
effect.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Surveys
The first survey was distributed prior to the beginning of the study, and had a 42%
response rate. Of the responses received, officers indicated that most likely, on average,
when writing an incident report, the MO section is completed 0% (M=25%), or 10%
(M=18%) of the time. When the MO section is complete, it was reported that it was
completed because they were asked to do so (M=52%), however officers were in high
agreement about never receiving feedback from a supervisor after completing the MO
section (M=96%). When asked how often they believed that MO information has lead to
solving crime, the most frequently selected option was 10% (M=33%), with 0% as a
close second (M=26%). Based on a sample of general comments provided at the end of
the survey, it appears that the officers are not reporting MO simply because either they
forget to include the information in the report or they feel that the MO information is only
relevant to certain types of crimes (i.e., burglaries or robberies) rather than all types of
crimes. Given the lack of compliance with the MO form completion to date, on the
survey officers agreed (M=77%) that by completing the necessary information that
ILeads functionality would be increased, which could potentially help solve future crime.
The second survey that was distributed at the end of the study had a response rate
of 25%. Due to the low number of surveys that were received, no formal analysis or
conclusions could be drawn from the post-study survey.
40
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MO Form Completion
Figure 9 displays the percentage of MO form completion for burglary crime type
across the day shift (top panel), night shift (middle panel), and power shift (bottom
panel). The day and night shift increased their MO form completion over baseline levels
after task clarification, both group feedback forms and the general order were
implemented systematically. The power shift's MO form completion data were highly
variable during baseline, however the form completion levels stabilized more after the
general order was implemented. Ideally, it would have been more desirable to implement
the first treatment when the data were in a downward trend, as shown from week's seven
to nine in the graph. While waiting for the final data point for a downward trend, shown
in week 10, an officer in the department was killed in the line of duty. At that point in
time, due to the constraints on department resources and other extenuating circumstances
not related to the data, it appeared that waiting a few more weeks was necessary before
any treatment could be implemented.
On average across shifts, officers had an opportunity to complete approximately
21 burglary incident reports per week. Baseline levels for burglary across all shifts were
somewhat variable, more so for the power shift (M=39%, SD=32.3) compared to the day
(M=29%, SD=16) and night shift (M=27%, SD=22.68), possibly due to the smaller
number of officers on the power shift compared to the other shifts. Although day shift
burglary showed less variability during baseline compared to the other shifts, the range
was still somewhat large between 9% to 66%. After task clarification and PSO group
feedback was implemented for day shift, the level changed only slightly (M=39%,
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Figure 9. Percentage of MO Form Completion for Part I Burglary
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SD=1.8); it appeared that this the introduction of this intervention had little effect on
behavior change. This then led to the addition of sergeant group feedback plus the option
to reject reports. Once the sergeants were given the option to reject reports and given
feedback on incident reports accepted without MO form completion, larger gains in level
changes and stability were observed (M=81%, SD=11.5). During the partial reversal
phase, the MO form completion maintained (M=76%, SD=6.3). The next phase, the
general order phase, did not show much of an improvement compared to the previous
phases (M=80%, SD=8.4). Figure 10 shows the mean percentages for each of the phases
for the burglary crime type across all shifts.
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Figure 10. Mean Percentage MO Reporting for Burglary for All Phases
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After the night shift received the first intervention package of task clarification,
PSO group feedback and sergeant group feedback, MO form completion increased by
37% (M=64%, SD=25). This was a slightly larger increase compared to day shift,
although followed by a downward trend in this phase of the intervention that later
stabilized at lower levels. During the partial reversal, MO form completion decreased to
58% (SD=15.8), and then increased again during the general order phase to similar levels
of the previous condition (M=77%, SD=19.5).
The power shift remained in baseline throughout the study, except at the end
when the general order was released organization-wide. This shift is considered a support
shift that helps the day and night shifts during peak hours. Although this shift completes
reports, they complete on average 3 reports a week due to the nature of their function,
somewhat decreased (SD=24.7, range 33%-100%). Power shift's MO form completion
never decreased to 0% levels during this phase. Overall, according to the results for MO
form completion for burglary, the shifts that received the task clarification and both forms
of group feedback resulted in higher and more stable levels of MO form completion
compared to the shift that only received that general order.
Figure 11 displays the pooled data for percentage of MO form completion for
both robbery and aggravated assault crime type across the day shift (top panel), night
shift (middle panel), and power shift (bottom panel). Figures 12-13 shows the mean
percentages for each of the phases for both robbery and aggravated assault crime types
across all shifts. Appendix L contains the non-pooled data for percentage of MO form
completion for robbery and aggravated assault crime types across all shifts.
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Figure 11. Percentage of MO Form Completion for Part I Robbery and Aggravated
Assault Pooled Data
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Officers on average, across shifts, had an opportunity to complete three incident
reports for robbery and six incident reports for aggravated assault. Baseline levels for MO
form completion for day shift was stable at zero levels for robbery (M=17%, SD=41)
with the exception of two data points that indicated 100% MO form completion.
However MOs were never completed for aggravated assault (M=0, SD=0) for day shift
during baseline. After the day shift received task clarification and PSO and sergeant
group feedback, MO form completion increased for robbery (M=25%, SD=38), and
aggravated assault (M=11%, SD=18). During the partial reversal phase, only robbery
decreased slightly (M=17%, SD=24), while aggravated assault increased (M=15%,
SD=30). The largest increases for day shift were observed during the general order phase
for both robbery and aggravated assault respectively (M=60%, SD=55), (M=44%,
SD=39).
Baseline levels for the night shift MO form completion were more stable for
robbery (M=3%, SD=10.5), than for aggravated assault (M=12%, SD=31). After the PSO
group feedback and sergeant group feedback plus report rejections was introduced, MO
form completion increased for robbery (M=18%, SD=33.4), but decreased to 0% for
aggravated assault. During the partial reversal phase, MO form completion for both
robbery (M=25%, SD=29), and aggravated assault (M=26%, SD=18) saw an increase.
However, the largest increase was observed during the general order phase with robbery
increasing to 80% (SD=27), and aggravated assault showing a slight increase to 28%
(SD=15).
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Once again, the power shift remained in baseline throughout most of the study for
both robbery (M=32%, SD=46) and aggravated assault (M=4%, SD=13). Baseline trends
for both crime types were highly variable during baseline, ranging from 0% to 100% for
robbery and 0% to 50% for aggravated assault. During the general order phase, robbery
increased (M=50%, SD=46), while aggravated assault decreased to 0%, and remained at
0% for the remainder of the study. Similar to the results for burglary, MO form
completion for robbery and aggravated assault are completed at higher levels when task
clarification and both forms of group feedback are implemented compared to only the
general order.
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Sergeant Option to Reject Reports
After task clarification and PSO group feedback was implemented for the day
shift, it was apparent that an additional intervention component was necessary to achieve
higher results for MO form completion. The next step was to add sergeant option to reject
reports without MO form completion and group graphic feedback to sergeants on reports
accepted without MO form completion. Figures 14 and 15 displays the percentages of
reports accepted by sergeants without MO form completion across all phases for
burglary, then robbery and aggravated assault pooled, respectively. During baseline,
reports were being accepted without MO form completion for day shift at 70% (SD=16)
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Figure 15. Percentage of Robbery and Aggravated Assault Reports Sergeants Accept
Without MOs Pooled Data
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and during task clarification and PSO group feedback at 61% (SD=1.8). When sergeant
feedback on percent of reports rejected without MO was implemented for the day shift
there was an immediate decrease in sergeants accepting reports without MO form
completion (M=19%, SD=11.5). During the partial reversal condition, sergeants
continued to accept reports without MO form completion (M=19%, SD=13.7) in the
absence of feedback. When the general order was implemented, which would allow the
sergeants to formally reject reports due to incomplete MO sections, sergeants continued
to accept reports without completed MO sections on average of 19% (SD=8.4).
During baseline, night shift sergeants were accepting incomplete MO section
reports on average 72% (SD=26). The night shift was the first to receive the full package
intervention of task clarification, PSO group feedback, sergeant group feedback on
reports accepted without MO form completion and sergeant option to reject reports. Once
this intervention was implemented, accepting of incomplete MO reports decreased to
35% (SD=25.8), however there did appear to be a slight upward trend. When feedback
was removed during the partial reversal condition, accepting of incomplete reports
continued at similar levels and upward trend (M=33%, SD=26.9). The general order
phase saw slightly further reductions in accepting of incomplete reports overall (M=23%,
SD=19.5), but according to visual analysis there was not a significant difference between
the general order phase and the previous phases when the sergeants were given the option
to reject the reports. The power shift did not receive this intervention, therefore there are
no data to report.
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During baseline for both day and night shift, sergeants were accepting reports
without completed MO sections for robbery (M=83%, SD=40.1; M=93%, SD=21.1) and
aggravated assault (M=100%, SD=0; M=88%, SD=31.6) at a higher level compared to
the burglary crime type across day and night shift respectively. For the day shift, after the
package intervention was implemented, sergeants accepting reports without MO form
completion decreased for both robbery (M=75%, SD=38) and aggravated assault (M=88,
SD=18). During the partial reversal phase, there was only one week where reports had an
opportunity to be rejected if no MO was included; therefore no trend could be
established. However, for the single data point probe that is available during this
condition (M=46%), it remains at a much lower acceptance rate compared to the previous
condition when the sergeants were receiving feedback. When the general order was
introduced, overall acceptance of reports without completed MO sections for robbery
(M=40%, SD=54.8) and aggravated assault (M=44%, SD=38.9) was the lowest across all
conditions-it appeared that for these two crime types, for the day shift, the general order
condition was the most effective intervention, with sergeant option to reject reports as the
next best intervention option.
The night shift followed a very similar trend overall in sergeants accepting reports
without MO form completion. When the first combined intervention was implemented,
overall the acceptance of MO reports by sergeants remained the same, but had more of
an effect for robbery (M=82%, 33.4) then aggravated assault (M=100, SD=0), which
actually increased. Similar to the day shift, during the partial reversal phase, there was a
drastic decrease in the acceptance of incomplete reports for both robbery (M=50%,
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SD=40) and aggravated assault (M=64%, SD=3.9). After the general order was
implemented, no further overall decreases in level were observed for robbery (M=40,
SD=41.8) or aggravated assault (M=72, SD=15.4). These results are consistent with the
MO form completion results for robbery and aggravated assault in that sergeants began to
accept less incomplete MO reports during the partial reversal phases and general order
phase compared to the previous phase in which feedback was implemented.
When analyzed separately, the number of reports rejected by sergeants
throughout the study varied as the various phases were implemented. Figure 16 shows the
number of reports that sergeants rejected across all conditions and shifts throughout the
study. During baseline, sergeants were rejecting 1 report per week (range, 0-4). When
the interventions were implemented across all shifts and crime types, sergeants rejected
on average 3 reports per week (range, 0-9). However an increasing trend is evident when
all interventions were implemented. When feedback was removed during the partial
reversal phase, sergeants continued to reject reports (M=6, range, 5-8), but at a higher
rate than the previous phases. During the general order phase, report rejections overall
decreased to levels similar to when the interventions were implemented (M=3, range, 17), which further emphasizes that when the sergeant option to reject reports appeared to
have a greater effect on form completion than feedback.
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Figure 16. Number of Reports Rejected by Sergeants Across All Shifts and Crime Types

Completeness Data
When officers completed the MO section, the MO information provided were also
analyzed for completeness. Figures 17-19 display the percentage of completeness of the
MO section for across all conditions and crime types. For the MO items that were
indicated by the officers in the report, two independent observers recorded an "x" in the
"yes" column if the indicated MO's were listed in the officer's narrative, and "x" in the
"no" column if the recorded MO was not listed in the narrative. MO items that were
indicated as "no" were not counted as discrepancies. During baseline, the burglary MO
reports were fully completed on average 80% (range, 56%-100%) of the time. When all
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interventions were in implemented for day and night shift, MO incident reports were fully
completed 71% (range, 50%-93%) of the time. The partial reversal phase on average
reported an overall increase in completeness (M=76%, range, 70%-83%), however the
data path was within range compared to the previous phase. The general order phase
showed less variability, but also resulted in the lowest level of completeness (M=67%,
range, 62%-74%). Visual inspection appears to show that while the task clarification and
both group feedback interventions were in place, MO incident form completeness
occurred at similar levels compared to when the interventions were not implemented.
Furthermore, when the general order was enacted, completeness decreased, possibly due
to the officers no longer receiving group feedback.

Figure 17. Percentage of Completeness of MO Section for Burglary Reports
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During baseline, MO incident form completeness for robbery and aggravated
assault was highly variable. For robbery, completeness occurred at 56% (range, 27%94%), while for aggravated assault completeness occurred at 61% (range, 0%-100%).
When all interventions were implemented, the overall averages for both robbery
(M=57%, range, 27%-85%) and aggravated assault (M=57%, range, 22%-83%) remained
relatively the same, as did variability. The partial reversal phase for robbery showed a
higher level of completeness (M=72%, range, 60%-84%), although firm conclusions
could not be determined based on two data points in this phase. Aggravated assault
reports were fully completed on average 35% of the time (range, 30%-50%), however,
there was a slight increase in trend after an initial phase change. The general order phase
again provided more variability for both robbery (M=70%, range, 44%-100%) and
aggravated assault (M=62%, range, 30%-80%), however the range was not as prominent
as the previous phases.
Discrepancy Data
While completeness data were reviewed, discrepancy data were also recorded.
Discrepant MOs resulted when an MO was indicated in a report, but the listing did not
match the information provided in the narrative (i.e., method of entry-forced door
selected as an MO, but the narrative stated method of entry-no force). Figure 20
represents the percentage of discrepancies found in the 49% of reviewed burglary
incidents. During baseline, discrepancies occurred infrequently, except during one week
(M=1%, range, 0%-10%). When task clarification and PSO and sergeant group feedback
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Figure 18. Percentage of Completeness of MO Section for Robbery Reports

Figure 19. Percentage of Completeness of MO Section for Aggravated Assault Reports
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plus report rejections was implemented, discrepant information occurred infrequently,
except toward the end of the phase (M=1%, range, 0%-8%). The partial reversal phase
experienced more frequently occurring errors compared to the previous phases (M=2%,
range, 0%-3%). However, during the general order phase higher variability of
discrepancies occurred (M=4%, range, 0%-8%). It appears that higher levels of
discrepancies occurred during phases in which task clarification and feedback were not
implemented.

Figure 20. Percentage of Discrepancies in Sampled MO Burglary Reports

Occurrence of discrepancies were highly variable for both robbery and aggravated
assault. Figures 21-22 represent the percentage of discrepancies for robbery and
aggravated assault. During baseline, discrepant information reported in robbery incidents
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was observed as being highly variable (M=10%, range, 0%-50%), but almost all cases,
except one, reviewed during baseline indicated some discrepant information (M=44%,
range 0%-100%). When task clarification and both group feedback interventions were
implemented, the discrepant data contained in robbery reports decrease, except one week
where the reports contained discrepancies (M=7%, range , 0%-33%); aggravated assault
showed similar results during the same phase (M=5%, range, 0%-33%). The partial
reversal condition for robbery only contained two variable data points, (M=5%, range,
0%-11%) and aggravated assault showed similar variable results (M=28%, range, 17%67%). The general order condition showed differing results for robbery and aggravated
assault. During this condition, discrepancies appeared to increase and occur at a higher
frequency for robberies (M=10%, range 0%-25%), while aggravated assault
discrepancies occurred rarely, except during one week (M=3%, range, 0%-13%).

Figure 21. Percentage of Discrepancies in Sampled MO Robbery Reports
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Figure 22. Percentage of Discrepancies in Sampled MO Aggravated Assault Reports

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The results of this study show that using task clarification and group feedback to
officers and sergeants alone had little effect on MO inclusion in reports. However,
instructing sergeants that they can reject reports and providing them with feedback on the
percentage of reports they accepted without MO included led to higher MO reporting.
The results also may suggest that using these interventions prior to imposing an
organizational policy change may lead to better performance following the policy change.
Further, the overall quality as measured by completeness of MO section and discrepancy
between narrative and MO section of the incident reports did not appear to decrease to
any great extent when either intervention was implemented.
The intervention effects appear to be more effective when applied to the burglary
crime type because burglaries were a more frequently occurring compared to others. As
noted in comments from the pre-study survey, some of the officers only considered MO
information to be effective in solving certain crime types, specifically burglary. During
baseline, MO form completion for both day and night shift were highly variable, but
occurred at lower levels. Once task clarification and group feedback for both PSOs and
sergeants were implemented immediate increases were observed across both shifts. These
higher levels of form completion continued during the partial reversal and general order
for both shifts, however, were somewhat variable for the night shift compared to the day
shift. MO form completion for power shift was highly variable during baseline, however
61
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variability somewhat decreased during the general order phase. Similar levels of form
completion were not observed for the power shift during the general order phase
compared to the other shifts. Based on these results, it appears that the shifts that received
the task clarification and group feedback interventions completed a higher percentage of
MO incident forms compared to the power shift, which only received the general order.
The results for robbery and aggravated assault crime type appear at first glance to
have had less than an effect compared to the burglary crime types. However, robbery and
aggravated assaults occur far less often than burglaries. The results appear to show that
for day shift, MO form completion occurred more often when the officers received
feedback and during the general order. During the night shift, the general order appeared
to have a better effect on MO form completion. For power shift, the data were highly
variable and appears to be unaffected by the general order, except for one week. The
results also indicated that sergeant report acceptance without MO form completion
appeared to occur less for burglary than the other types. Perhaps the reason being that the
sergeants felt the MO information was more relevant for the burglary crime type
compared to other types of crimes.
Overall, the results of this study are similar to the findings with of Jones, Morris,
and Barnard (1985), which evaluated the effects of a feedback package intervention on
civil commitment form accuracy completion and timeliness of completion. Officers
entered completed the incident forrm information for the MO section at a much higher
percentage across all shifts after the interventions were implemented. However, the
results differ from Jones, Morris, and Barnard (1985) in that overall completeness was
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uneffected by the interventions. Although some information was omitted from the MO
report section, the overall completeness of the reports was not directly affected by the
interventions of this study. With that said, there did appear to be some room for
improvement regarding completeness. One approach to this problem was the layout of
the MO form. For example, the general layout of MO section can make it somewhat
difficult to remember to select all of the relevant MOs to a specific incident. For example,
the current MO list has 18 initial categories of MO types, then within each initial
category there are more specific MOs related to that initial category. Although the MOs
have categories currently, it is currently segmented into different MO actions and gives
no indication if an MO is more relevant for a specific crime type. Given the ambiguity
with the current categories, a suggestion could be to create a category system for each
crime type and place relevant MOs under each category; this will allow for the officers to
work off the same crime type definitions and reduce the amount of missing items in the
MO section.
There were a few methodological concerns with the design presented in this
study. Given the schedule of the shifts, there was a risk of contamination of information
with the power-shift involvement due to the overlapping times with the day shift and the
night shift. The high variability in the power shift's data across crime type could possibly
be due to contamination, but more likely due to the function of the power shift. The
power shift is a support shift; the officers assigned to this shift do not complete as many
incident reports as those on day or night shift. Given the support function and shift time,
task clarification and group feedback was not implemented with this shift. A positive
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aspect of the current design is that it was crafted to analyze changes across behaviors and
shifts.
Over the course of the study, there was an issue with officer attrition. As
mentioned in the Method section, one of the PSOs was killed in the line of duty during
baseline, just prior to the intervention being implemented. Since the data were being
analyzed as group performance, this individual's data were not parsed out of baseline
data. It is worth noting however that the officer's death that occurred during baseline was
not a direct result of the study. In addition to this isolated incident, budget cuts and
organizational constraints caused the organization to cut several positions from within the
department. Although the eliminated positions did not directly affect the number of
participants evaluated, it did have an impact on who was on what shift.
While the intervention was in place a procedural issue was brought to the
experimenter's attention that needed to be addressed immediately. One concern was
ensuring that the emails with the graphic feedback were sent to the necessary shifts ontime. The experimenter ensured that the Executive Lieutenant had the necessary materials
for the weekly email no later than Tuesday morning by 11:00am. For some weeks the
subsequent email to the officers with that information wouldn't be sent until Thursday of
the same week due to the Executive Lieutenant's work responsibilities not involving the
study. In cases when the email was not sent out by Wednesday, the experimenter
prompted the Executive Lieutenant to send the email. However, in all weeks when the
intervention was in place, the officers did receive the appropriate email.
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Another approach to increasing MO completion would be to require its
completion before the report is submitted. When an officer completes an incident report,
there are specific pieces of information that are required to complete, known as required
fields, prior to saving and exiting out of the system. The current database settings do not
indicate MO as a required field. Completion of the MO page was not a required field
because the ILeads system is an inter-agency data management system; several other
police agencies within the county of Kalamazoo use the same database to manage their
incident reports. If a required field setting change were to occur for KDPS, all other
agencies using the system would experience the same setting change. Those agencies
were not willing to allow the MO be a required field change within the system, hence, the
need for alternative methods to increase MO field completion the intervention
components used in this study.
There are also some limitations to the current MO field in the ILeads system. For
example, descriptions of items stolen, known as "object of entry" do not denote a section
for drugs, to indicate if the burglary was related to a drug case. Another example would
be descriptions of the suspect's attire compared to weapons; currently there are 31 options
for a weapon type compared to seven for the suspect's attire.
Another limitation was that some items listed in the narrative were somewhat
vague, which would have allowed the selection of several relevant MOs in the current
listing. For example, if a robbery narrative indicated that a suspect threatened a victim
with a weapon, then based on the list two possible MOs are relevant to the case (e.g.,
threat/points at victim, threat/assaults victim-no shots). However, the selection of one or
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more similar items would depend on the specific circumstances of the case as indicated in
the narrative. This made it difficult to obtain high IOA on missing items. As explained,
due to the wide variety of MO options, and lack of consistency across narrative reports,
the missing MO component had to be re-reviewed by the observers. Retraining of the
experimenter and the research assistant was necessary to ensure both independent
observers were reviewing all cases under the same parameters. After retraining occurred,
entire narratives had to be reevaluated. Each observer recorded their results
independently and IOA was re-recorded.
Since the beginning of the study, there have been several discussions with
administration about the current MO list in ILeads. One recommendation to
administration is that the list should be revised to improve MO recording and crime
intelligence gathering from the officers. This would require research and cooperation
with other agencies to determine what other data management systems are in current use
and see what information is best to have in the system. If the list were to be revised, there
are certain restrictions on the information technology side that would require cooperation
with Intergraph®, however the department is willing to at the very least have the
discussions to ensure the department is utilizing the functionality of the system as much
as possible.
A couple of the suggestions officers offered on the surveys might also be
considered to improve report writing process. One of the suggestions was to categorize
the MO list according to crime type. My recommendation would be to have a group of
command officers along with PSOs get together as a focus group and review the current
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list for categorization. The focus group could then go through each crime type, review the
current list as a whole and select which MOs should be listed under which crime type.
The categories could help aid the officers in their selection of applicable MOs and reduce
the amount of missing MO information for each incident. This could also help reduce the
amount of time an officer spends scrolling through the long list of MO information
provided for each MO group type, which would reduce the response effort associated
with completing the MO section.
Another officer suggestion was to place the MO information on page 2, as
opposed to its current location on page 3 because the narrative information and incident
classification (e.g., break & enter, robbery, aggravated assault) are also located on page 2.
This new page location would further reduce the response effort (Casella et al., 2010;
Friman & Poling, 1995) associated with alternating back and forth between two pages to
complete the MO section since MO information is the only information that needs to be
filled out on page 3. If all of the narrative and MO section were located on page 2, rather
than page 3, the MO section would a) be more salient to officers, b) could reduce the
response effort of switching between multiple screens within the incident form to
complete the necessary information, and c) might increase MO form completion.
However, the suggestions provided above are both systems changes that would require
assistance from Intergraph®, and would result in a fee for the changes. These
recommendations might be more difficult to implement due to funding constraints.
Follow up research should examine the effects of reducing response effort alone and its
impact on MO completion.
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Another recommendation would be to provide more direct information about the
utility of MO reporting to the officers. If the officers are informed of how the information
that they are gathering is later being used in the process of crime prediction, then it's
possible that the quality of the information in the officers reports might increase. Once a
crime is solved or a suspect is captured based on the MO information the officers
provided in their reports, feedback on this success should be provided to the officers so
that in the future they are aware that someone other than their direct supervisor is
reviewing their reports and providing praise.
Overall this study was able to demonstrate that the use of task clarification, PSO
and sergeant group feedback plus the sergeant option to reject reports and policy change
are effective interventions when improving incident form completion. The administrators
in the department reported being satisfied with the overall results since improvements
were observed without the use of monetary incentives or punitive measures. Another
interesting component was the use of performance improvement techniques prior to
imposing an organizational policy change; one might speculate that this technique might
lessen the impact for the employees. Future research could address the impact of adding
similar interventions that would address the nature of the policy prior to the change being
implemented for the organization.
There are several benefits relating to predictive ability resulting from the
implementation of the treatment. One benefit was that entering MO information in ILeads
records enabled detectives and members of administration to search in the database for all
crimes that have occurred with a specific MO pattern. This information ultimately helps
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the department determine crime patterns that might assist them in deployment of
departmental resources by enabling them to better predict where and when future crime
may occur.
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List of All MOs in ILeads
Code_FBI
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Description
POINT OF ENTRY
EXIT
METHOD OF ENTRY
MEANS OF ENTRY
EVIDENCE
ALARM
PRESENCE OF VICTIM
WEAPON
ACCOMPLICES
OBJECT OF ENTRY
SOLICITED/OFFERED
FIREARM FEATURE
THREATS
SUSPECT ACTIONS
FORCES VICTIM TO DO
SUSPECT WORE
SUSPECTS KNOWLEDGE
FORCE USED
SEX ACTS

Group Code
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6

Description
UNKNOWN POINT
FRONT DOOR
BACK DOOR
SIDE
SIDE DOOR
WINDOW
FLOOR
ROOF
CONCEALED
UNKNOWN
SAME AS ENTRY
FRONT DOOR
REAR DOOR
SIDE DOOR
WINDOW
NO FORCE
DOOR REMOVED
BROKE/REMOVED GLASS
PRIED/JIMMIED LOCK
USED PASS KEY
PRIED
RIPS
SAWS
FORCE WINDOW
FORCE DOOR
KEY
PRYING TOOL
SAW/DRILL
BRICK/ROCK
BODILY FORCE
INCENDIARY
SCREWDRIVER
KNIFE/CUTTING TOOL
HAMMER/MALLET
LOCK PICK/PLASTIC CARD
REMOVED AIR CONDITIONER/FAN
HID IN BUILDING
BROKE/REMOVED DOOR PANEL
CUT/BROKE LOCK
BEER CANS
CIGAR/CIGARETTES
PRINTS
MATCHES
NOTES
AMMO SHELLS
TOOLS
TOOLMARKS
WEAPON
NO ALARM
INOPERATIVE
DEFEATED

Group Code
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

Description
UNKNOWN
BLACK/BLUE
CHROME
STAINLESS BARREL
SINGLE BARREL
DOUBLE BARREL
AUTOMATIC
REVOLVER
SAWED OFF
FIRES WEAPON
ASSAULT VICTIM/NO SHOTS
STATES HAS BOMB/EXPLOSIVES
THREATENS VICTIM
PUTS GUN IN TRAY
IMPLIED HAD WEAPON
COVERED WITH PAPER/COAT
KEPT IN POCKET
KEPT IN BAG
POINTS AT VICTIM
COCKS WEAPON
USED NOTE
JUMPS COUNTER
TAKES PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM VICTIM
OPEN REGISTER
OPEN SAFE
PLACED PROPERTY IN BAG/SACK
SNATCHES PROPERTY
CARRIED BRIEFCASE, ETC.
FORCED ENTRY
FOLLOWED VICTIM
RANSACKS
OPEN REGISTER/PLACE PROPERTY IN BAG
SUSPECT REMOVED PROPERTY/CASH FROM REGISTER
DISROBE
HANDS IN AIR/BEHIND HEAD
TO COUNT
TO WAIT TO CALL POLICE
OPEN REGISTER
OPEN SAFE
PLACE PROPERTY IN BAG/SACK
HAND OVER PROPERTY/CASH
TO FACE ANOTHER WAY
PLACE HANDS ON STEERING WHEEL
MOVE TO BACK OF BUSINESS
FACIAL COVERING
HALLOWEEN MASK
SKI MASK
STOCKING MASK
COAT/HOOD OVER HEAD
GLOVES
SUNGLASSES
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Group Code
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Description
TRIPPED
AUDIBLE ALARM
ON PREMISES
AT WORK
ON VACATION
UNKNOWN
FICTITIOUS GUN
HANDGUN
RIFLE
SHOTGUN
OTHER GUN
UNDETERMINED FIREARM
KNIFE
RAZOR
AX/HATCHET
SAW/CUTTING TOOL
BOW & ARROW/CROSSBOW
OTHER SHARP INSTRUMENT
JIMMY/PRY TOOL
PLIERS/WRENCHES
POUNDING TOOL
PUNCHING TOOL
KEY/LOCK BYPASS INSTRUMENT
OTHER BLUNT INSTRUMENT
HANDS, FIST, FEET, ETC.
GAS/AIR POWER PROJECTILE
POISON
CHEMICAL/ACIDS
PUSH/THROW OUT WINDOW
EXPLOSIVES
FIRE
NARCOTIC OR DRUG
DROWNING
STRANGULATION/HANGING
ASPHYXIATION
UNKNOWN OR NOT STATED
OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPON
NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR OR MORE
UNKNOWN
AUDIO-VISUAL
AUTO PARTS
BUILDING MATERIALS
CIGARETTES
CLOTHING
COIN OPERATED MACHINE
COPPER/BRASS
GOLD/SILVER/JEWELRY

Group Code
10
10
10
10
10
10
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18

Description
GUNS
HOUSEHOLD GOODS
MONEY/SAFE
OFFICE EQUIPMENT
TELEVISION/STEREO
TOOLS
LIQUOR
MONEY
CIGARETTES
FOOD
GAS/OIL/AIR
INFORMATION
RIDE
AMUSEMENT/GAME
ASSISTANCE
DRINK
CANDY
EMPLOYMENT
SEX
DRUGS
USE OF PHONE
USE OF TOILET
VICTIM HITCHHIKING
CASES SITE
USED LOOKOUT
KNOW COMPLAINANT
UNUSUAL COMMENTS
VICTIM MAKING BANK DEPOSIT
DRIVER IN GET-AWAY CAR
WORK WITH FEMALE ACCOMPLICE
COMPLAINANT KNEW SUSPECT
FORCED TO OTHER LOCATION
FORCED TO FLOOR
TIED/TAPED UP
HANDCUFFS
BLINDFOLDED
COVERED VICTIMS FACE
CUT/STABBED
BRUTAL ASSAULT
THREATEN VICTIMS FAMILY
CHOKE
HIT DURING ACT
KIDNAPPED
TWISTED ARM
KICKED
HELD DOWN
FORCED INTO AUTO
FORCED INTO SMALL ENCLOSURE
TIED TO OBJECT (BED, ETC.)
GAGGED
BURNED VICTIM

Group Code
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
3
3
10
10
7

Description
BIT
WHIPPED (WITHOUT HANDS)
COVER MOUTH WITH HANDS
THREATS
HIT AFTER ACT
HIT PRIOR TO ACT
PULLED VICTIMS HAIR
TORE CLOTHES OFF VICTIM
TORE PHONE OUT OF WALL
URINATION
SADISM
PUT HAND INTO VAGINA
MASOCHISM
SODOMY - RECTAL
PORNOGRAPHY
VICTIM DID ABNORMAL ACTS
VICTIM MASTURBATE SUSPECT
VICTIM MASTURBATE SELF
SUSPECT MASTURBATE SELF/VICTIM
REACHED CLIMAX
TOUCH/FONDLE VICTIM
DISROBE SUSPECT
SUCKED BREASTS
PENETRATED FROM REAR
SODOMY - ORAL SEX ON VICTIM
SODOMY - ORAL AND RECTAL SEX
REQUIRED HELP TO ACCOMPLISH ACT
DEFECATION
PUTS OBJECT INTO VAGINA
SET FIRE
PHOTOGRAPHED VICTIM
FETISHISM
TONGUE OR MOUTH TO ANUS
TALK ABOUT BODY FUNCTION
OBSCENE/PROFANE WRITING
SIMULATED INTERCOURSE
UNABLE TO GET ERECTION
KISSED VICTIM
DISROBED VICTIM
USED PROPHYLACTIC
VICTIM FORCED TOP POSITION
MULTIPLE VICTIMS
SODOMY/ORAL BY VICTIM
RAPE OR ATTEMPT
NO UNUSUAL ACTS
CONSENT
CUT SCREEN
IDENTIFICATION
CREDIT CARDS
ASLEEP
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Copper Theft Case Study: MO Usage to Assist in Predictive Analysis
Once the interventions were implemented across all shifts for all crime types, the
experimenter began reviewing all of the MOs that were being compiled in the ILeads data
management system. The burglary crime type was the main crime type reviewed because
this crime type occurred more frequently compared to robbery and aggravated assault. At
this point in the study, the MOs were being recorded more often by the officers, hence
there were more data in the record system to pull from to find crime patterns.
The experimenter initially began by looking at specific points of entry per zone
(there are six zones within the city). Then, common day occurred and time of day were
parsed into three-hour time blocks. Next, the most common object of entry based on the
common point of entry was evaluated. It was during this process that the common point
of entry across the city (based on officer MO report completion), was windows during the
hours of 9:00am and 6:00pm. Although televisions and laptop computers appeared to be
common objects of entry, these were burglaries that were occurring across the city with
no common trend. However, a common object of entry that was found by looking at
window point of entry, was copper piping theft.
The experimenter next asked the Senior Systems Analyst to download all of the
incident reports that indicated copper piping as an object of entry between the dates of
January 01, 2011 to November 15, 2011. From this download, there were a total of 26
total incidents. Four additional incidents were added to the list where the property stolen
was copper piping, but the MO section was not completed. The incidents were then
placed in order of date occurrence. Then, these incidents were sent to a specialist that
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works at City Hall to map the geographic-x and geographic-y coordinates associated with
each incident in order of occurrence. Figure I-A is a copy of the incident reports that was
later mapped. Figure I-B is a copy of the first version of the map used to determine the
copper piping trend. The experimenter confirmed with the Executive Lieutenant and the
Criminal Investigative Division that there was indeed a copper theft trend occurring in
the city, however, further information into the crimes had come up short.

Incident_ID Date_Occu

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

11009280
11009280
11010381
11010381
11009011
11009011
11013656
11013637
11011314
11011253

4/20/2011
4/20/2011
5/30/2011
5/30/2011
6/8/2011
6/8/2011
7/1/2011
7/12/2011
7/14/2011
7/15/2011

11012972

08/01/11

11012402
11013635

8/3/2011
8/6/2011

11012841

08/10/11

11013149
11013205
11013206
11013207
11013208
11013209
11013314

8/15/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/17/2011

11013249

08/17/11

11013371

08/19/11

11015609 9/20/2011
11015862 9/25/2011
11015963 9/27/2011
11016121 9/27/2011
11016273 10/2/2011
11017366 10/19/2011
11018944 11/15/2011

Day Occ Hour_OccuMICR CodeMICR Description
Zone Geo X

Wed
Wed
Mon
Mon
Wed
Wed
Fri
Tue
Thu
Fri
Mon
Wed
Sat
Wed
Mon
Tue
Tue
Tue
Tue
Tue
Wed
Wed
Fri
Tue
Sun
Tue
Tue
Sun
Wed
Tue

Geo Y

M.O. Group 1

1320
1320
1200
1200
1600
1600
0
900
1700
1052

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279089585
ENTRY RESIDENC
28798048 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
5
1279089585
ENTRY RESIDENC
28798048 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279243286
ENTRY RESIDENC
28651502 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
5
1279243286
ENTRY RESIDENC
28651502 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED
5
1279001391
BLDG 29328030
OR OTH.STRUCT.
OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED
6
1279001391
BLDG 29328030
OR OTH.STRUCT.
OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279278684
ENTRY RESIDENC
28884704 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED
1
1279278674
BLDG 28883902
OR OTH.STRUCT.
OBJECT OF ENTRY
22002 BURGLARY-NO
6 FORCED
1278351676
ENTRY NON
28666986
RESIDENCE
OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279277764
ENTRY NON RESIDENCE
28776158 OBJECT OF ENTRY

1600

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279090736
ENTRY NON
28986995
RESIDENCE

955
900

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279121810
ENTRY RESIDENC
28763669 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED
1
1279133426
BLDG 28817633
OR OTH.STRUCT.
OBJECT OF ENTRY

1303

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279209215
ENTRY RESIDENC
28972979

1301
1440
1252
1509
1517
1517
1900

22002 BURGLARY-NO
6 FORCED
1279168421
ENTRY RESIDENCE
28656062 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279167213
ENTRY RESIDENC
28656090 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279278194
ENTRY RESIDENC
28851614 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279114733
ENTRY RESIDENC
28698005 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279174275
ENTRY RESIDENC
28809137 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279207436
ENTRY RESIDENC
28885893 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279115436
ENTRY RESIDENC
28716105 OBJECT OF ENTRY
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M.O. Group 2

COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS

22002 BURGLARY-NO
6 FORCED
1279065691
ENTRY28987361
NON RESIDENCE

1207

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
5
1278986305
ENTRY RESIDENC
29157414

1000
1647
1008
2100
1315
1900
1025

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
4
1279197715
ENTRY RESIDENC
29357953 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22002 BURGLARY-NO
5 FORCED
1278850545
ENTRY RESIDENCE
29273177 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
1
1279134808
ENTRY NON RESIDENCE
29072156 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
5
1278850545
ENTRY NON RESIDENCE
29273177 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
3
1280012161
ENTRY RESIDENC
29397026 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
5
1278999317
ENTRY RESIDENC
29383732 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED
6
1279100637
ENTRY NON RESIDENCE
28698403 OBJECT OF ENTRY

COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS

Figure I-A. Copper Theft Incident Report Data Provided in Map for November 15, 2011
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Figure I-B. Copper Piping Theft Trend Map-Created November 15, 2011
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Over the next few weeks, additional data were gathered and more related
incidents were added to the overall list of copper theft crimes. The next round of data
were compiled and an updated map had been revised on December 16, 2011. A total of
five more cases were added to the list of theft incidents. Relevant cases indicating
building materials as an object of entry were also added to the list of incidents. Figure I-D
is a copy of the revised map, and Figure I-C is a copy of the data used in the revised map.
In addition to the map, data regarding common day and time of occurrence were provided
based on the information inputted into the system by the officers. Figures I-E-I-I below
are the tables that were shown to the detectives in CID.
On December 21, 2011, the experimenter was asked to give a brief presentation
on the information gathered to date based on the copper thefts. The information provided
to CID thus far has helped lead to the installation of silent alarms in one neighborhood
where the copper thefts were commonly occurring. This information has also, led to
increased patrols in targeted neighborhoods where the thefts were commonly occurring.
Since the beginning of the analysis, there has been a noticeable decline in the copper theft
trend. A few explanations could either be related to the MO information provided in the
ILeads reports that have led to criminal arrests, or seasonal changes. Copper thefts
appeared to occur more in the summer months when the targeted homes were vacant due
to home renovations. To date, the copper thefts are still open cases, however the data
provided in the MO section has helped the detectives gain certain leads when no other
options were available.
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Incident_ID Date_Occu

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

11009280
11009280
11010381
11010381
11009011
11009011
11013656
11013637
11011314
11011253

Hour_OccuMICR CodeMICR Description

NBHD

Geo X

Geo Y

M.O. Group 1

4/20/2011
4/20/2011
5/30/2011
5/30/2011
6/8/2011
6/8/2011
7/1/2011
7/12/2011
7/14/2011
7/15/2011

1320
1320
1200
1200
1600
1600
0
900
1700
1052

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279089585 28798048 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 5RESIDENC
1279089585 28798048 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279243286 28651502 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 5RESIDENC
1279243286 28651502 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED 5BLDG OR
1279001391
OTH.STRUCT.29328030 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED 6BLDG OR
1279001391
OTH.STRUCT.29328030 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 1RESIDENC
1279278684 28884704 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED 1BLDG OR
1279278674
OTH.STRUCT.28883902 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22002 BURGLARY-NO FORCED ENTRY
6 NON1278351676
RESIDENCE 28666986 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6NON RESIDENCE
1279277764 28776158 OBJECT OF ENTRY

11012972

08/01/11

1600

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY
6 NON 1279090736
RESIDENCE 28986995

11012972
11012402
11013635

8/1/2011
8/3/2011
8/6/2011

1600
955
900

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6NON RESIDENCE
1279090736 28986995 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279121810 28763669 OBJECT OF ENTRY
22001 BURGLARY-UNNOCCUPIED 1BLDG OR
1279133426
OTH.STRUCT.28817633 OBJECT OF ENTRY

11012841

08/10/11

1303

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY
1 RESIDENC
1279209215 28972979

11013149
11013206
11013205
11013207
11013208
11013209

8/15/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011
8/16/2011

1301
1252
1440
1509
1517
1517

22002 BURGLARY-NO FORCED ENTRY
6 RESIDENCE
1279168421
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 1RESIDENC
1279278194
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279167213
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 1RESIDENC
1279114733
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279174275
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 1RESIDENC
1279207436

28656062 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28851614 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28656090 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28698005 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28809137 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28885893 OBJECT OF ENTRY

M.O. Group 2

COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
BUILDING MATERIALS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS

11013249

08/17/11

910

11013314

8/17/2011

1900

22002 BURGLARY-NO FORCED ENTRY
6
NON
1279065691
RESIDENCE
28987361

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279115436 28716105 OBJECT OF ENTRY

11013371

08/19/11

1207

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY
5 RESIDENC
1278986305 29157414

11013883

8/22/2011

1300

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6RESIDENC
1279173212 28730177 OBJECT OF ENTRY

BUILDING MATERIALS

11014947

09/12/11

1237

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY
3 RESIDENC
1280121262 29397370 OBJECT OF ENTRY

BUILDING MATERIALS

11015609 9/20/2011
11015862 9/25/2011
11015860 9/25/2011
11015963 9/27/2011
11016121 9/27/2011
11016273 10/2/2011
11017366 10/19/2011
11018944 11/15/2011
11020180
12/06/11

1000
1647
1509
1008
2100
1315
1900
1025
1503

22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 4RESIDENC
1279197715
22002 BURGLARY-NO FORCED ENTRY
5 RESIDENCE
1278850545
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 2RESIDENC
1279928162
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 1NON RESIDENCE
1279134808
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 5NON RESIDENCE
1278850545
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 3RESIDENC
1280012161
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 5RESIDENC
1278999317
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 6NON RESIDENCE
1279100637
22001 BURGLARY-FORCED ENTRY 3NON RESIDENCE
1279956917

COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
BUILDING MATERIALS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS
COPPER/BRASS

29357953 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29273177 OBJECT OF ENTRY
27911243 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29072156 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29273177 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29397026 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29383732 OBJECT OF ENTRY
28698403 OBJECT OF ENTRY
29184989 OBJECT OF ENTRY

COPPER/BRASS

Figure I-C. Copper Theft Incident Report Data Provided in Map for December 16, 2011

104

Figure I-D. Copper Piping Theft Trend Map-Created December 16, 2011
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Figure I-E. Copper Theft-Common Day

Figure I-F. Copper Theft-Common Month
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Figure I-G. Copper Theft-Common Time

Figure I-H. Copper Theft-Common Day and Time
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Figure I-I. Copper Theft-Common Zone

Appendix J
Task Clarification Memorandum
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Task Clarification Memorandum

Appendix K
General Order
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General Order
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
KALAMAZOO MICHIGAN
GENERAL ORDER

February 5, 1971
Index Number G-65
INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORT WRITING

I.

PURPOSE:
To establish guidelines for conducting investigations, report writing and report review.

II.

PROCEDURE:
A.

The majority of the reports shall be written or taped in the field. Complex cases
may require the completion of reports in a station equipped with reference
materials and telephone. Officers using a station for report completion shall
notify a supervisor and dispatch.

B.

When an incident occurs on a street, the location shall be reported with reference
to the nearest street address. If there is no nearby address, use the block number
(example: 1400 block of W. Main St.). If the incident occurred at an intersection,
describe in the narrative where in the intersection (i.e., compass point).

C.

In cases involving more than one officer, the primary officers narrative shall
include a summary that ties the entire investigation together.

D.

To insure proper case routing, when the connected case box on the lower right
of the PD100 applies, write what that connecting case is (i.e., 96-00123, A&B).

E.

Officers are responsible for conducting complete and thorough investigations.
This includes the gathering of evidence, locating and interviewing all involved
persons and completing all necessary reports. When a suspect is arrested for a
criminal offense (CID will interview suspects in major cases such as homicide,
etc.), the suspect shall be read Miranda warnings, questioned regarding the
offense, and information gained shall be in the report.
1.

When obtaining suspect information from the Records computer, be
certain you have the correct person prior to listing the information on the
PD100. Ask witnesses/complainants detailed questions to assist in such
matching and document your reasoning. If you are not certain you have
the correct person, list the information on a memo.
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2.

Always document how a suspect was identified (i.e., Ops, ID, etc). If a
complainant only has a suspicion who the suspect is, without a factual
basis, list the person on a memo, not in the PD100 suspect section. If
suspect is unknown, list unknown in involved section on PD100.

3.

Search for and interview witnesses (i.e., contact neighbors). If you dont,
document why! Take photos and prints when applicable. If you dont,
document why!

4.

When evidence is not seized due to compliance with G.O. 131, document
the reason, as Prosecutors need this information.

5.

Prior to seizing a videotape of a suspected crime, have the complainant
cue the tape at the point of the suspect arrival, and clarify this point in
your report. If this cant be done until later, have the complainant call
when the tape is ready.

6.

When complainants do not wish to prosecute in crime against person
cases, officers and detectives shall have them sign a No Prosecution
form. A parent or guardian shall sign for juveniles.

7.

Refer to Ops SP-12 for Judicial Review Procedures.

8.

When completing a report of a part one crime (i.e. CSC, Homicide,
UDAA, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Arson, Burglary, and Larceny)
the M.O. section shall be completed.

F.

When an officer writes or tapes the report narrative, section headers shall be used
to describe the content of each section. Do not use general terms in the PD100
summary or report narrative, such as caused trouble, used obscene
language, was assaulted, etc. Be very specific as to what the person did or
said. Refer to people by their last names. If two or more persons have the same
last name, use their first names. Write the case number on all attachments (i.e.,
LEIN work, memo, copies, etc.)

G.

Officers opinions shall not be written into reports. If an officer has an opinion
about a case, document it on a memo and attach the memo to the report.

H.

When a ticket is written or evidence is gathered, the ticket number and evidence
locker number shall be included in the report.

I.

To prevent unnecessary duplication, items listed on a PD101 property sheet
should not be re-listed in the narrative report. However, important factors
regarding the PD101 items shall be in the narrative, such as location they were
taken from.

J.

When an officer completes a report or reviews a typed report, the officer shall
write the officers name at the end of the report along with the date, and time the
report was completed.
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K.

Officers shall not hold reports or tickets without command authorization. Officers
shall complete arrest reports prior to going off-duty. Officers shall promptly
submit reports to command for review. Command officers shall ensure CID
arrest reports and CID Domestic Violence reports are promptly placed in the Shift
Commanders Office.
1. Career Criminal Histories (CCHs) and KDPS arrest records shall be
attached to all arrest cases if the following day is a weekend or holiday.
The officer shall have the CCH run under the ORI# of the office which
will be handling the case (i.e. Prosecutor, etc.). Also, all domestic
violence and retail fraud cases must have these documents.
2. KDPS personnel shall ensure their names/signatures are legible in
reports and on other documents. Personnel may print their names if
necessary.
3. Command officers shall review all cases turned in during their shift and
bring them to headquarters from time-to-time during the shift. Command
officers are responsible for the accuracy and completeness of reports they
review and approve. When an investigation is lacking, command officers
shall take appropriate supervisory action to insure an officer performs
complete investigations in the future.
4. Reports needing minor correction shall be corrected by the reviewing
command officer, or that command officer shall have the officer correct
the report prior to the end of the shift. If the officer is not available, the
report shall be sent to the Records Bureau with an error report attached,
and the pink copy of the error report shall be sent to the officer with
instructions. The original error report shall be filed in the officers
incident file.
5. When an officer receives a report or citation back for correction, the
correction shall be completed on that duty day. If this cannot be done, the
officer shall inform that officers immediate supervisor. Reports and
citations in need of correction shall not be removed from headquarters.

Q.

Command officers shall submit a supplemental report when supervising felonies
and major cases, such as a homicide, fatal traffic accidents, major disturbance,
etc. or in cases in which they were actively involved.
1. Command officers shall insure that reports requiring LEIN entry are promptly
brought to the Communications Center (i.e.; Breathalyzer or Refusal forms,
UDAA etc.). Command shall ensure that a copy of UDAA, Missing Person and
RAW cases (requiring LEIN entry) accompanies the original to the
Communications Center.
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S.

Command shall ensure that criminal reports contain elements of the crime(s),
probable cause if there was a search or arrest, Miranda compliance, and that
evidence was properly handled. Case numbers shall not be reassigned and a
report shall be written for each case number. PD105 code for case not needed
is 9889.
1. When a City of Kalamazoo employee is involved in a crime, a copy of
the report shall be routed through the chain-of-command to Human
Resources.

U.

The Incident Commander or designee shall complete the National Fire Incident
Report (NFIRS) on fire incidents. Illegal burning cases do not require a NFIRS.
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G.O. 65
Page Four

Effective:

Revised Date:

given
Distribution:
contents

February 5, 1971
BY ORDER OF:
October 15, 1983
June 3, 1996
September 27, 2000
October 27, 2011

A,B,C, & E

JEFF HADLEY
CHIEF OF PUBLIC
SAFETY
I have read this policy and been
the opportunity to discuss its
with

__________________________
__________________________
Officer
SIGNED: Employee

Date: _____________________

my supervisor.

Command

Appendix L
Non-pooled Percentage of MO Form Completion
for Robbery and Aggravated
Assault Across Shifts
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Non-Pooled Percentage of MO Form Completion for Robbery and
Aggravated Assault Across Shifts

